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CRIMINAL LAW
Rape Reform in South Carolina
Following a trend that has been gathering momentum across
the United States' the 1977 South Carolina General Assembly
enacted a comprehensive law on criminal sexual assault.2 The
legislature repealed the old statute,3 which embodied the
common-law definition of rape, and substituted three degrees of
criminal sexual conduct.4 The enactment also replaces the South
Carolina statutory rape provisions' with a section on criminal
sexual conduct with minors.6 To complement its blanket revision
of the substantive elements of the preexisting crimes of rape,
assault with intent to ravish, and statutory rape, the General
Assembly enacted provisions covering matters that previously
had been left to judicial development. These provisions include
rules governing culpability when the victim is the legal spouse of
the defendant, 7 providing that the testimony of the victim need
not be corroborated, 8 eliminating the common-law rule that a boy
under fourteen is presumptively incapable of rape,' and excluding
most evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct. 0 These
changes in the South Carolina law of sexual assault are dramatic.
Some provisions will undoubtedly be controversial. This survey
section will evaluate the statute by comparing it with the pre-
vious law in South Carolina and with the law as it is developing
1. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § § 782, 1103 (West Supp. 1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 13961.5 (West Supp. 1978); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § § 1127d, 1127e (West Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011-.022 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 782.4 (Supp. 1977);
MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a-.5201 (Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 40A-9-20 to
-26 (Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § § 2907.01 - .29 (Supp. 1977).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § § 16-3-651 to -659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
3. Id. § 16-3-630 (1976) (repealed 1977). See State v. Gilchrist, 54 S.C. 159, 41 S.E.
866 (1898). The statute "relates to what is frequently referred to as 'common-law rape'
.... " State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 270, 89 S.E.2d 701, 713 (1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 861 (1955).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § § 16-3-652 to -654 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
5. Id. § 16-3-650 (1976) (repealed 1977).
6. Id. § 16-3-655 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct with a minor is punishable as if the conduct had been committed. Id. § 16-3-656.
7. Id. § 16-3-658.
8. Id. § 16-3-657.
9. Id. § 16-3-659.
10. Id. § 16-3-659.1.
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in other jurisdictions. Where the change is especially drastic an
effort will be made to explore possible ramifications, including
the possibility that some sections of the new legislation may be
unconstitutional under the state or federal constitutions.
I. CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT UNDER THE ACT
Rape is nonconsensual intercourse. South Carolina's re-
pealed statute read: "Whosoever shall ravish a woman, married,
maid or other, when she did not consent, either before or after,
or ravisheth a woman with force, although she consent after, shall
be deemed guilty of rape."" The South Carolina Supreme Court
has traced the origin of this statute back to an English statute
enacted in 1285.12 Because of the statute's antiquity and lack of
definition, the courts necessarily developed a judicial gloss cover-
ing the elements of the crime-force, lack of consent and penetra-
tion.'3 The courts also developed a comprehensive scheme of de-
fenses" and evidentiary requirements. '5 This hodgepodge of
statutory and decisional law was capped with a sentencing provi-
sion that granted the judge discretion to confine the defendant
"for a term not exceeding forty years or less than five years
... 1" This system had a number of possible deficiencies. By
definition a male could not be a victim.'" Whether the statute
reached other kinds of nonconsensual sexual conduct that might
be equally as offensive to the victim as nonconsensual intercourse
11. Id. § 16.3-630 (1976) (repealed 1977).
12. "[Sltatute of 13 Edward I, chapter 34." State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 272,
89 S.E.2d 701, 714 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955).
13. State v. Flemming, 254 S.C. 415, 175 S.E.2d 624 (1970); State v. Thomas, 248
S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966); State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963);
State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955);
State v. Sudduth, 52 S.C. 488, 30 S.E. 408 (1897); State v. Haddon, 49 S.C. 308, 27 S.E.
194 (1896).
14. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900) (where defendant claims
that burden is on state to prove lack of consent); State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E.2d
623 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 979 (1962) (insanity). But see State v. Gatlin, 218 S.C.
414, 38 S.E.2d 238 (1946) (irresistible impulse not a defense).
15. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900) (reputation of prosecu-
trix may be the subject of inquiry, but reputation for chastity after alleged rape not
admissible); State v. Pearson, 103 S.C. 481, 88 S.E. 255 (1916) (character of prosecutrix's
companions inadmissible); State v. Black, 204 S.C. 414, 29 S.E.2d 675 (1944) (timeliness
of complaint); State v. Harrison, 236 S.C. 246, 113 S.E.2d 783 (1960) (fact of complaint
may be shown in corroboration). But see State v. Gatlin, 208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 238
(1946) (testimony of prosecutrix need not be corroborated).
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-640 (1976) (repealed 1977).
17. Id. § 16-3-630 (repealed 1977).
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CRIMINAL LAW
was uncertain.'8 The sentencing provision was highly discretion-
ary and could produce extreme results at both ends of the spec-
trum. The severity of the sentences depended upon the judge who
happened to be presiding.' 9 The new sexual assault law, however,
has partially rectified these problems.
The concept of the 1977 law is to divide criminal sexual con-
duct into three varying degrees in a descending order of serious-
ness. 0 All three degrees focus on what the statute terms "sexual
battery."' 2' Sexual battery is defined as "sexual intercourse, cun-
nilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the
genital or anal openings of another person's body, except when
such intrusion is accomplished for medically recognized treat-
ment or diagnostic purposes. 2 2 The purpose of the statute is to
proscribe all kinds of offensive nonconsensual sexual conduct that
intrude upon the body of the victim and to bring this conduct
within the confines and penalty provisions of the statute. For
instance, the statutory definition of "victim" as a "person alleg-
ing to have been subjected to criminal sexual conduct . ."
makes it clear that sexual battery can be perpetrated upon a male
or a female. Consequently, a case of sexual assault upon a male
can now be prosecuted without resort to the South Carolina bug-
gery statute.2 4 A novel application of the statute, and a com-
pletely possible one, would be the prosecution of a female for
sexual assault upon a male. Similarly, a female who commits a
lesbian assault upon another female could be prosecuted under
the Act.
Criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree is the most seri-
ous offense under the Act. Section 16-3-652 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the victim
and if any one or more of the following circumstances are
proved:
18. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-630 (1976) (repealed 1977) with the definition of
"sexual battery" in § 16-3-651(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
19. See L. TOLIVER, SENTENCING AND THE LAW AND ORDER SYNDROME IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (1974).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § § 16-3-652 to -654 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
21. Id. and § 16-3-651(h).
22. Id. § 16-3-651(h).
23. Id. § 16-3-651(i).
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(a) The actor uses aggravated force to accomplish sexual
battery.
(b) The victim submits to sexual battery by the actor
under circumstances where the victim is also the victim of forci-
ble confinement, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, burglary,
housebreaking, or any other similar offense or act."
Subsection (b) needs no elaboration. To understand subsection
(a), however, resort to the definitions section 2 of the statute is
necessary. "Aggravated force" is defined as the use of "physical
force or physical violence of a high and aggravated nature to
overcome the victim or includes the threat of the use of a deadly
weapon." 2 To sustain a conviction under this section something
more than a mere threat of harm to the victim must be proved.
If only a threat is made, it must be a threat to use a deadly
weapon. Whether a conviction could be obtained when the actor
threatens the use of a deadly weapon but does not actually have
one in his possession is not clear. An answer is suggested by the
South Carolina law providing enhanced penalties for possession
of a firearm during the commission of rape, assault with intent
to ravish and other crimes.2 That section requires that the de-
fendant actually be armed with or have in his possession some
type of firearm.2' An argument against an absolute requirement
that the defendant actually have possession of a weapon in all
cases is that the relevant factor should be whether the actor be-
haved in a manner that gave the victim reason to believe he was
armed. A threat to kill someone with a false but realistic weapon
is just as coercive as one in which a real weapon is utilized.
Second degree criminal sexual conduct, unlike first degree
sexual assault, does not require the use of violence or a threat of
the use of a deadly weapon to sustain a conviction. 0 An actor is
guilty of the offense if "aggravated coercion" is used "to ac-
complish sexual battery."3' "Aggravated coercion" as defined
in the statute
means that the actor threatens to use force or violence of a high
and aggravated nature to overcome the victim or another per-
son, if the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the
25. Id. § 16-3-652 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
26. Id. § 16-3-651.
27. Id. § 16-3-651(c).
28. Id. § 16-23-490 (1976).
29. Id.
30. Compare id. § 16-3-653 (Cum. Supp. 1977) with § 16-3-652 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
31. Id. § 16-3-653.
[Vol. 30
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present ability to carry out the threat, or threatens to retaliate
in the future by the infliction of physical harm, kidnapping or
extortion, under circumstances of aggravation, against the vic-
tim or any other person."
Because the crime is complete once a threat of force and a sexual
battery occurs, the victim could come into the courtroom with no
more than her testimony and a medical examiner's report show-
ing the existence of recent sexual activity. Because no actual
violence is required, indicia of force such as bruises or lacerations
will not necessarily be found. The absence of this kind of material
evidence sets the stage for the classic face-to-face confrontation
between the victim and the defendent. The outcome will turn on
the relative credibility of complainant and defendant. An indict-
ment under this section will therefore frequently raise the thorny
issues of consent, corroboration and credibility. Discussion of
these problems is reserved until later to accompany other rele-
vant portions of the new law.
Third degree criminal sexual conduct is the lowest magni-
tude offense under the statute.3 The.Act provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the vic-
tim and if any one or more of the following circumstances are
proven:
(a) The actor uses' force or coercion to accomplish
the sexual battery in the absence of aggravating circum-
stances.
(b) The actor knows or has reason to know that the
victim is mentally defective, mentally incapacited, or
physically helpless and aggravated force or aggravated
coercion was not used to accomplish sexual battery.34
"Aggravating circumstances" is not defined in the statute. This
omission is puzzling in light of the drafters' care in defining many
key words and phrases that are used throughout the statute. 'N
Without a definition, one can only surmise that the General As-
sembly intended that subsection (a) be a lesser included offense
of first and second degree sexual assault. This interpretation is
suggested by the language used in the definitions of "aggravated
force""6 and "aggravated coercion."37 In first degree sexual assault
32. Id. § 16-3-651(b).
33. Compare id. § 16-3-654 with § § 16-3-652 to 16-3-653.
34. Id. § 16-3-654(1).
35. See id. § 16-3-651.
36. Id. § 16-3-651(c).
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the force used must be "of a high and aggravated nature' ' '3" and
in second degree a threat "to use force or violence of a high and
aggravated nature . . ." in the coercion of the victim must
occur.3 1 If the force used or threatened is not "high and aggra-
vated" the conviction could not be in the first or second degree
but instead would properly be in the third degree under subsec-
tion (a).
Under the statute first degree criminal sexual conduct is
punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding, thirty
years.4" This reduces by ten years the maximum penalty that may
be imposed; unlike the former statute, however, the present stat-
ute sets no minimum term.' The elimination of a minimum sen-
tence means that a defendant convicted of first degree criminal
sexual conduct might escape imprisonment altogether and suffer
nothing more than probation. The irony of this situation is that
the legislature, which so carefully delineated the differences be-
tween first, second, and third degree criminal sexual conduct
regarding both the type of conduct involved and the maximum
penalty accessible, could see its intent thwarted by statutory pro-
visions that allow sentencing that ignores the spirit of the new
law, which is to sentence according to the severity of the offence.
The same problem also applies to second and third degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct, which are punishable by maximum sentences
of twenty and ten years, respectively.2 In neither case is a mini-
mum set." As a result, those who have applauded the advent of
rape reform legislation in South Carolina may be unpleasantly
surprised when some offenders are back on the street sooner than
they would have been under the former statute, which had a five
year minimum sentence provision." Perhaps the best argument
in favor of the omission of a minimum sentence provision is that
the legislature, while trusting trial judges to impose severe sen-
tences when they are warranted, wanted to give the judges flexi-
bility to consider factors mitigating against the imposition of
lengthy prison sentences.
38. Id. §§ 16-3-652, 16-3.651(c).
39. Id. § § 16-3-653, 16-3-651(b).
40. Id. § 16.3-652(2).
41. Compare id. § 16-3.640 (1976) (repealed 1977) with § 16-3-652(2) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
42. Id. § § 16-3-653(2), 16-3-654(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
43. Id.
44. Id, § 16.3-640 (1976) (repealed 1977).
[Vol. 30
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I. REFORM OF THE STATUTORY RAPE LAW
The statutory rape provision of the 1977 Act" drastically
changes the law in South Carolina. This change, when examined
in light of South Carolina's unusual constitutional provision on
minors' consent to intercourse, creates several thorny issues that
must be examined.
The South Carolina Constitution, in article three, section
thirty-three, states that "[n]o unmarried woman shall legally
consent to sexual intercourse who shall not have attained the age
of fourteen years."46 This provision, which is highly unusual, has
caused great difficulty for the courts when they have been con-
fronted with cases involving intercourse with minors. The statu-
tory law as it existed prior to the 1977 Act made carnal knowledge
of a woman under the age of sixteen a criminal act regardless of
whether she consented." The penalties for the crime, known as
"statutory rape," varied according to the age and sexual past of
the victim and the age of the criminal." The relationship between
this statute and the constitutional provision was discussed in
several cases by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In State v.
Smith49 the court held that the statutory rape provision was not
unconstitutional. The decision was based almost entirely upon
the earlier case of State v. Haddon,"0 in which the court held that
the constitutional provision
did not, of itself, create a criminal offense. By its own operation
there did not spring into existence such crime as the carnal
knowledge and abuse of an unmarried woman under the age of
fourteen years. . . .The constitutional provision operated only
on the question of consent to sexual intercourse, creating a new
rule of evidence in the proof of consent, declaring certain per-
sons incapable of consenting.5 '
The court in Smith, relying upon the Haddon decision, held that
the constitutional provision related only to common-law rape and
that the legislature could therefore pass a law making sexual
intercourse with a woman under sixteen a criminal act.52
45. Id. § 16-3-655 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
46. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 33.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-650 (1976) (repealed 1977).
48. Id.
49. 181 S.C. 485, 188 S.E. 132 (1935).
50. 49 S.C. 308, 27 S.E. 194 (1897).
51. Id. at 314, 27 S.E. at 196 (emphasis in original).
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In State v. Whitener53 the supreme court gave its fullest ex-
,position of the relationship between statutory rape and the so-
called common-law rape. Whitener involved an incident of sexual
intercourse between an adult and an eleven-year-old girl. The
indictment contained counts alleging both common-law and
statutory rape. Defendant excepted to this and claimed that the
common-law rape count should not have been submitted to the
jury. His contention was that proof of force was necessary to prove
the common-law rape of a girl under fourteen years old.,' The
court rejected this argument, holding that the constitutional pro-
vision made proof of force unnecessary. 5 Of greatest relevance to
the present discussion is the court's recognition that a man hav-
ing sexual intercourse with a girl under fourteen could be con-
victed of either statutory rape or common-law rape. " This result
leads to the conclusion that, even if no statute dealt with inter-
course with minors, the constitutional provision, combined with
the common-law rape section, would make criminal any inter-
course with a girl under fourteen.
Under the statute enacted in 1977, the law is changed to a
great degree. Section 16-3-655 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the victim
who is less than eleven years of age and the actor is at least three
years older than the victim.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with a vic-
tim who is fourteen years of age or less but is at least eleven
years of age and the actor is at least three years older than the
victim.
(3) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with a vic-
tim who is more than fourteen years of age but who is less than
sixteen years of age and the actor is in a position of familial,
custodial, or official authority to coerce the victim to submit. 7
The relative age provisions of subsections (1) and (2) are novel,
in that they make noncriminal certain acts of intercourse with
girls fourteen and under. They require close attention, particu-
53. 228 S.C. 244, 89 S.E.2d 701 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955).
54. Id. at 267, 89 S.E.2d at 712-13.
55. Id. at 274, 89 S.E.2d at 716.
56. Id.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 30
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larly in light of the South Carolina constitutional provision.
Under subsection (1), if a twelve-year-old boy engages in
consensual sexual intercourse with a ten-year-old girl, he will not
be guilty of first degree criminal sexual conduct." Under subsec-
tion (2), if a fifteen-year-old boy has intercourse with a thirteen-
year-old girl, who consents to the act, he will not be guilty of
second degree sexual conduct.59 These examples demonstrate that
under the 1977 statute, sexual intercourse may at times take
place with a girl under fourteen without the male partner being
criminally culpable. At first glance this result might appear to
violate the constitutional provision, which specifically states that
an unmarried girl under fourteen cannot legally consent to inter-
course. The analysis that follows suggests a rationale by which
any attempt to circumvent the statutory rape provision enacted
in 1977 could be defeated.
The supreme court held in Haddon that the constitutional
provision merely created a conclusive presumption that a girl
under fourteen is not capable of consent to sexual intercourse."
This is a rule of evidence. If lack of consent is not an element of
a crime, the provision will have no legal effect. Under the statu-
tory rape provision enacted in 1977, the activities proscribed are
criminal whether the victim consents or not.61 For instance, a
thirteen-year-old girl could actively seduce a seventeen-year-old
boy, and he would be guilty of second degree criminal sexual
conduct. There is, therefore, no conflict between the constitu-
tional provision and the 1977 statutory rape law.
A prosecutor might attempt to prosecute a boy, not culpable
under the statutory rape section, for first, second, or third degree
criminal sexual conduct. This attempt might arise in any case in
which a girl under fourteen and a boy less than three years older
than she engage in sexual intercourse. The prosecutor's rationale
would be that, under Whitener, force need not be shown to prove
the common-law rape of a girl of less than fourteen, as she is
conclusively incapable of legal consent.2 This argument, how-
ever, falls under its own weight. The sections of the 1977 Act
58. Id. § 16-3-655(l).
59. Id. § 16-3-655(2).
60. 49 S.C. at 314, 27 S.E. at 196.
61. Of course, if the victim did not consent to the act, the indictment would likely
be for criminal sexual conduct of the first, second, or third degree. The lack of consent
would be strong evidence that the sexual act was accomplished through the use of force
or coercion.
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describing first, second, and third degree criminal sexual conduct
generally make the criminality of an act dependent upon the use
of force or coercion; 3 these sections do not mention consent at all.
Unless the prosecutor can prove force, coercion, helplessness of
the girl, or that the act took place when the girl was also the
victim of a crime, he will not be able to convict the boy of any
offense at all under the 1977 Act.
One or two other legal theories might be tried to convict the
boy of a crime. First, a prosecutor could seek to bring an indict-
ment for common-law rape against the boy. Rape was a crime at
common law,6" and lack of consent was undoubtedly an element
of that crime." Therefore, the boy would have no defense to a
common-law indictment. The prosecutor's chances of success-
fully maintaining the common-law action would be very slim,
however. Defense counsel would be able to argue persuasively
that the 1977 Act shows the legislative intent to abrogate com-
pletely the common law relating to rape.6 While the ordinary rule
is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be con-
strued narrowly,6" when, as here, the legislature has thoroughly
dealt with a subject the legislative intent ought to be respected.
The prosecutor's last effort might be to seek an indictment
for battery. Battery is generally defined as an "unauthorized
touching." 8 Because the constitutional provision makes a girl of
under fourteen incapable of consent to sexual intercourse, the
prosecutor might argue that sexual intercourse with any girl
under that age is an unauthorized touching and, therefore, a bat-
tery. Although this argument has a good degree of logical consist-
ency, the legislative intent to make noncriminal certain acts
should not be defeated by simply changing the name of the crime.
The constitutional provision was obviously designed to operate in
the sphere of rape law, and its effect should not be felt outside of
that realm.
63, S.C. CODE ANN. § § 16-3-652 to -654 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
64. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 210-14.
65. The old South Carolina statute was a precise statement of the common-law rule,
and it specifically referred to acts "when she [the victim] did not consent. . . ." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-630 (1976) (repealed 1977).
66. Because the ancient statute was clearly a codification of the common law, its
repeal should serve as conclusive evidence of the legislative intent to abrogate the common
law.
67. See Major v. National Indemn. Co., 267 S.C. 517, 229 S.E.2d 849 (1976).
68, See Trogun v. Truchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (where a
battery is defined as "an intentional contact with another which is unpermitted." Id. at
594, 207 N.W.2d at 310).
[Vol. 30
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The 1977 statutory rape provision is a great improvement
over the prior law. It is based upon the proposition that, while
children who consent to sexual activity with those older than they
are frequently being exploited, when both partners to an act are
of approximately the same age and degree of maturity, the polic-
ing of these activities can be better performed by the families
than by the criminal justice system. The statute should with-
stand any attempt to utilize the unusual South Carolina constitu-
tional provision to negate its effect.
III. THE NO-CORROBORATION RULE
A number of states have enacted laws eliminating the re-
quirement of corroboration in rape prosecutions. 9 South Caro-
lina, as part of its sweeping reform of the law of rape, has likewise
incorporated a provision in its sexual assault law stating that
"[t]he testimony of the victim need not be corroborated in pros-
ecutions. .. "" under the statute. To understand why a corrobor-
ation requirement would be imposed at all or why it should not
be required, it is helpful to explore briefly the reasoning behind
corroboration requirements, whether imposed by statute or case
law.
The rationale for a corroboration requirement is probably
caught up in the notion expressed three centuries ago by Lord
Hale that rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to
be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho
never so innocent."" Indeed one court suggested that the only
reason corroboration is required is the danger of a fabricated
story. 2 Another reason given for requiring corroboration is that it
is in the nature of the crime that eyewitnesses are seldom avail-
able. 3 Concern has also been expressed that the public outrage
over the indecency of the act may overbear the presumption of
innocence. One court stated that "[p]ublic sentiment seems in-
clined to believe a man guilty of any illicit sexual offense he may
be charged with .... -,7
The arguments against requiring corroboration, on the other
69. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1) (Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520(h) (Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-24 (Supp. 1975).
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-657 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
71. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635.
72. Thomas v. United States, 387 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
73. Stapleman v. State, 150 Neb. 460, 34 N.W.2d 907 (1948).
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hand, are based on the possibility that these requirements can
raise barriers to the successful prosecution of sexual assailants.
Corroboration of the victim's testimony is not required in prose-
cutions for other crimes, such as robbery or assault. The experi-
ence in New York State is a good example of the problems that
can be caused by corroboration requirements. At one time the
legislature there imposed a corroboration requirement for cases of
rape.75 Because of the statute, the courts thrashed about in an
effort to elucidate just what was required in the way of corrobora-
tion.76 Finally, the prosecutors themselves began bringing rape
cases as assault with intent to rape cases and foregoing the greater
charge for the lesser included offense because of the lack of a
corroboration requirement in that state for assault with intent to
rape.77 The New York courts eventually closed this loophole in the
statute.78 Since then, however, the New York corroboration stat-
ute has been repealed. 9 Perhaps the most powerful argument
against having a requirement of corroboration is that the costs of
having a strict requirement far outweigh the benefits gained by
it. The Constitution erects two barriers to wrongful convictions:
crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 0 and no con-
viction may be obtained without evidence that a crime has been
committed."1 These two rules should adequately protect rape de-
fendants without causing the problems associated with strict cor-
roboration requirements.
A number of states have judicially imposed corroboration
requirements but these requirements are often limited to situa-
tions in which the testimony of the prosecutrix appears in some
way unreliable. The courts appear to apply these requirements on
a case-by-case basis, when the particular circumstances seem to
warrant it. Corroboration has been required when the prosecutrix
has failed to make a prompt complaint,82 her testimony is contra-
75. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (McKinney) (repealed 1974).
76. See Note, Corroboration in the New York Criminal Law, 24 BRooKLYN L. REV.
324 (1958). See also People v. DeGroat, 5 App. Div. 2d 1045, 173 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1958),
affl'd, 5 N.Y.2d 947, 156 N.E.2d 921, 183 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 863
(1961); People v. Phillips, 204 App. Div. 112, 197 N.Y.S. 567 (1922), affl'd, 235 N.Y. 579,
139 N.E. 742 (1923).
77. See Note, supra note 76.
78. People v. English, 16 N.Y.2d 719, 209 N.E.2d 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965).
79. 1974 N.Y. Laws, ch. 14, § 1.
80. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
81. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
82. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 364 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Armstrong v.
State, 136 Tex. Crim. 333, 125 S.W.2d 578 (1939).
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dictory or improbable, 3 or her testimony was physically impossi-
ble or incredible."4 A list of corroborative circumstances may be
found in Allison v. United States:85
(1) medical evidence and testimony, (2) evidence of breaking
and entering the prosecutrix' apartment, (3) condition of
clothing, (4) bruises and scratches, (5) emotional condition of
prosecutrix, (6) opportunity of accused, (7) conduct of accused
at time of arrest, (8) presence of semen or blood on clothing of
accused or victim, (9) promptness of complaints to friends and
police, (10) lack of motive to falsify.8"
The court in Allison further indicated that "[t]his list, of course,
is not exhaustive, and the corroboration in each case 'must be
evaluated on its own merits.' ",87
Despite the arguments mentioned previously in favor of a
corroboration requirement and the various statutory and case law
adaptations of a requirement, no requirement existed at common
law.8 The general rule in South Carolina prior to the adoption of
the sexual assault law was that the testimony of the prosecutrix
did not need to be corroborated to establish the guilt of the defen-
dant.8" Therefore, the provision in the Act is not revolutionary.
In one case, however, State v. Francis Le Blanc, 10 the Consti-
tutional Court of South Carolina"' seemed to suggest that corro-
boration may be required when the complainant is a child.2 The
court in Le Blanc did not meet the issue head on, however. It
stated that "[tlhe commission of the act on so young a subject,
is in a great measure susceptible of proof from other circum-
stances. And in the present case, the testimony of the child is
strongly corroborated by circumstances, both as it relates to the
person and the fact." 3 The precedential value of the Le Blanc
83. See, e.g., People v. Simental, 11 Ill. App. 3d 537, 297 N.E.2d 356 (1973); State v.
Neal, 484 S.W.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1972); May v. State, 89 Nev. 277, 510 P.2d 1368
(1973).
84. State v. Haston, 64 Ariz. 72, 166 P.2d 141 (1946).
85. 409 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
86. Id. at 448 n.8.
87. Id.
88. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2061, at 342 (3d ed. 1940).
89, State v. Gatlin, 208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 238 (1946).
90. 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 339, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread. Const.) 394 (1813).
91. For a discussion of the Constitutional Court, which corresponds to the present
Supreme Court in South Carolina, see State v. Floyd, 174 S.C. 288, 320, 177 S.E. 375, 388
(1934).
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decision is probably minimal in view of the constitutional court's
power to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to grant a new
trial if the verdict was clearly against the weight of the evidence.
The South Carolina Supreme Court does not have this power
today." The court in Le Blanc could examine the adequacy of the
proof, in effect imposing a corroboration requirement as circum-
stances demanded, whereas the current supreme court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the jury in a rape case. 5 Ap-
peal in a criminal case is only for errors of law in South Carolina,
not for factual issues. This raises interesting questions concerning
the effect of the no-corroboration requirement imposed by the
legislature.
The absoluteness of the no-corroboration rule applies both to
the sexual assault and statutory rape provisions pf the new stat-
ute2 While good arguments for not requiring corroboration of the
testimony of adult complainants can be made,97 the case for no
corroboration when the complainant is a child stands on shakier
ground. In United States v. Wiley a twelve-year-old girl alleged
that she had been sexually assaulted by two men. The corrobora-
ting evidence "consisted of testimony of the two officers to the
effect that (1) the complainant was crying and upset, (2) her
clothing was disheveled, (3) she had no coat even though it was
a cold day, and (4) the complainant's prompt report of the alleged
incident to the officers." 9 The government had gone to trial with-
out having secured the testimony of the examining physician.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
said that "[tihe most effective corroboration of the complain-
ant's testimony would have been medical evidence."'' 9 With no
medical report and only the evidence above as corroboration, the
court observed that "[allthough this evidence may corroborate
the occurrence of some event, it does not corroborate sexual inter-
course."101 Furthermore, the court indicated that "scrutiny must
be exercised where, as here, the complainant is a young girl.
Courts have exhibited a 'traditional skepticism' towards accusa-
94. State v. Floyd, 174 S.C. 288, 320-21, 177 S.E. 375, 388 (1934).
95. Id. at 322, 177 S.E. at 388-89.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-657 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
97. See Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 463,
486-91 (1975).
98. 492 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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tions of children."'' 2 Considering these factors the court felt com-
pelled to reverse the conviction:
As a practical matter, the Government's case rested almost ex-
clusively on the testimony of the child. Any inference that sex-
ual intercourse or penetration occurred must be based on her
bare accusation. In these circumstances, the traditional purpose
of the corroboration requirement-avoidance of fabricated
charges-requires reversal of the defendant's conviction.""
If Wiley were tried today in South Carolina the conviction
would have to be sustained for two reasons. First, no corrobora-
tion at all is required. Second, as mentioned previously, on appeal
the South Carolina Supreme Court would not have the power to
review the sufficiency of the evidence. If no errors of law took
place at the trial, the conviction would have to stand so long as
the complainant produced any evidence from which a jury could
reasonably infer guilt.' 4
A Wiley situation within the context of South Carolina law
would pose a serious dilemma for the reviewing court. Because of
the statute requiring no corroboration for a conviction and the
limitation on the court's powers of review, the court, if it felt the
proof to be plainly inadequate, would have to either bend the
statute or its reviewing power. Neither is a highly palatable alter-
native. If defense counsel moves for a directed verdict, the su-
preme court will not have to face this problem. Under those cir-
cumstances the trial judge has the "duty to submit the case to
the jury if there is evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which
guilt may be fairly and logically deduced."'05 By reviewing the
trial court's disposition of a defense motion for directed verdict,
the supreme court can determine indirectly the inadequacy or
insufficiency of the evidence. This solution gives a South Carolina
court some flexibility in a case such as Wiley, in which the verdict
seems to be against the great weight of the evidence.
Another problem posed by the no-corroboration rule relates
to the behavior of the prosecution. For example, if the prosecution
has only two pieces of evidence, the testimony of the victim and
an ambiguous medical report, it probably would not put the med-
102. Id. at 550.
103. Id. at 551.
104. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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ical report in evidence in the absence of a corroboration require-
ment. On the other hand, if such a requirement were in force, the
prosecution would probably have to use the medical report to
satisfy the requirement and get the case to the jury. At the same
time, the ambiguity in the report would be helpful to the defense
by helping to create a reasonable doubt about the defendant's
guilt. This raises the question whether the prosecution can use
the no-corroboration rule as a shield to fend off defense requests
for evidence casting doubt on the state's case. It is already diffi-
cult to obtain pretrial discovery in criminal cases in South Caro-
lina;'08 the lack of a corroboration requirement by statutory man-
date could make it even more difficult for the defense to uncover
exculpatory evidence or to explore weaknesses in the state's case.
The state is not free, however, to withhold evidence that
casts doubt upon the guilt of the defendant. In Brady v.
Maryland"'0 the United States Supreme Court held that
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution."'0 8 The Court held in United
States v. Agurs'"I that nondisclosure by the prosecution of evi-
dence that raises a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the ac-
cused is a ground for a new trial even though the defense did not
request disclosure."0 The defense is, therefore, not completely
without recourse if the prosecution attempts to withhold evidence
on the grounds that the statute requires no corroboration.
As previously indicated, the statutory provision of a no-
corroboration requirement does not materially change the law on
that subject in South Carolina. It is, however, interesting that the
legislature felt a need to codify the rule requiring no corroboration
when that rule already existed in the case law of South Carolina.
The statutory mandate introduces inflexibility in the law when
corroboration is concerned and removes from the courts the lib-
erty of examining the matter on a case-by-case basis should that
need arise, as it would in a case like Wiley. Undoubtedly the
debate over the necessity for a corroboration requirement will
continue.
106. See J. THAMES, SOUTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL DEFENSE 43-44 (1976).
107. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
108. Id. at 87.
109. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
110. Id. at 112.
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IV. EVIDENCE OF THE VICTIM'S PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT
Of all the provisions of the 1977 sexual assault law perhaps
the most controversial will be the section on evidence of the vic-
tim's sexual conduct."' Section 16-3-659.1 provides:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and
reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be
admitted in prosecutions under §§ 16-3-652 through 16-3-656;
provided, however, that evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
with the defendant, or evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity with persons other than the defendant introduced to
show source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease about
which evidence has been previously introduced at trial shall be
admissible if the judge finds that such evidence is relevant to a
material fact and issue in the case and that its inflamatory or
prejudicial nature does not outweight [sic] its probative value.
Provided, however, that evidence of specific instances of sexual
activity which would constitute adultery and would be admissi-
ble under rules of. evidence to impeach the credibility of the
witness shall not be excluded.
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described
in subsection (1), the defendant, prior to presenting his defense
shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court shall
order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed
evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new evidence is
discovered during the presentation of the defense that may
make the evidence described in subsection (1) admissible, the
judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the
proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).112
The net effect is to strictly restrain the use of this type of evi-
dence. Because of the complexity of this provision, each type of
evidence and the various exceptions available will be explored in
the order of appearance in the statute.
The evidence provision of the law generally prohibits intro-
duction of evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual
conduct with two limited exceptions. First, any evidence of the
victim's prior sexual conduct with the accused is admissible. Sec-
ond, evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct with third
persons is admissable to show the source or origin of semen, preg-
nancy, or disease. This latter exception applies only when the
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prosecution has introduced evidence relating to semen, preg-
nancy, or disease." 3 This rule is not extraordinary. It is a restate-
ment of the majority rule that evidence of specific sexual activity
with persons other than the defendant is not admissible.", One
of the reasons often given for the rule is that consent with one
individual does not imply consent with another."- A second argu-
ment for the rule is that allowing this type of testimony would
encourage subornation of perjury; defendants would presumably
seek persons willing to testify falsely to sexual acts with the prose-
cutrix."5 Perhaps the strongest argument against this type of tes-
timony is that allowing its admission would create problems of
unfair surprise, prejudice, and confusion of issues. While these
arguments are valid for acts involving third parties, they have no
bearing when the specific acts involve the defendant. In that
instance the problems of suborned testimony, unfair surprise, and
confusion of issues are not present. Moreover, if the victim has
consented to sexual activity with the defendant in the past, it
may be more likely that the victim consented on the occasion that
is the subject of the trial. The same inference is not so readily
drawn when the activity was with a third party.
The semen, pregnancy and disease exception applies only if
evidence has been previously introduced at trial on the matter for
which the evidence is introduced." 7 The exception is very narrow.
If, for example, a medical report showed the presence of semen
on the person of the victim, it is unlikely that the semen was
present for more than a day; therefore, activity with a third party,
if it is going to be shown at all, must have occurred within a short
time period surrounding the alleged assault. The time frame, of
course, for pregnancy or disease is considerably greater. Prosecu-
tors will probably avoid introducing testimony about pregnancy
113. Id.
114. See Annot., 140 A.L.R. 364, 382-89 (1942). For recent cases holding that specific
acts of sexual intercourse on the part of the complaining witness are not admissible to
show that she consented to sexual intercourse with the accused, see State ex rel. Pope v.
Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976); McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74
(D.C. 1977); People v. Whitfield, 58 Mich. App. 585, 228 N.W.2d 475 (1975); State v.
Ruhr, 533 S.W.2d 656 (Mo. App. 1976); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975);
Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 218 S.E.2d 445 (1975); State v. Geer, 13 Wash.
App. 71, 533 P.2d 389 (1975).
115. "The fact that a woman consented to sexual intercourse on one occasion is not
substantial evidence that she consented on another, but in fact may indicate the con-
trary." State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 28, 545 P.2d 946, 952 (1976).
116. State v. Ogden, 39 Or. 195, 210, 65 P. 449, 454 (1901).
117. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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or disease if they know the prosecuting witness has engaged in
recent sexual activity with third persons. If no evidence on one
of these matters is introduced, the defense will be unable to intro-
duce -evidence of specific acts of sexual conduct with third par-
ties."8
Even when the evidence of specific sexual activity falls
within the exceptions to the general rule, it still must survive the
hurdle of an in camera hearing in which the court must determine
that the "evidence is relevant to a material fact and issue in the
case and that its inflamatory or prejudicial nature does not out-
weight [sic] its probative value." ' To survive the in camera
hearing the evidence must first meet the normal South Carolina
standard of relevancy recognized in Ellison v. Simmons:"" "All
that is required to render evidence admissible is that the fact
shown thereby legally tends to prove, or make more or less proba-
ble, some matter in issue and bear directly or indirectly
thereon."'2 This is not a particularly high standard in and of
itself. But the statute requires more. The court must see that the
probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential
for prejudice. 2' The courts will probably decide the question by
determining if the evidence, if admitted, would confuse the issues
or mislead the jury.'1 The interesting aspect of this standard for
admissibility is that the court is engaged in a simple balancing
test: probative value versus prejudice. The federal rule on the
exclusion of relevant evidence requires that the probative value
of the evidence be "substantially outweighed" by the danger of
prejudice before it can be excluded.' The federal rule is in line
with case law in South Carolina holding that "where there is
serious doubt as to the admissibility of evidence, the doubt
should always be resolved in defendant's favor."'1 The statute's
balancing test does not allow for any weighting of the scales in
favor of the defendant. If the potential prejudice to the state's
case is determined to outweigh the probative value of the evi-
dence at all, the evidence is to be excluded.
The evidentiary provision also excludes "opinion evidence of
118. Id.
119. Id. § 16-3-659.1(1)-(2).
120. 238 S.C. 364, 120 S.E.2d 209 (1961).
121. Id. at 368, 120 S.E.2d at 211.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
123. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 438-41 (2d ed. 1972).
124. FED. R. Evm. 403.
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the victim's sexual conduct."'26 Although it is difficult to differen-
tiate between opinion evidence and reputation evidence'2 the
rule in South Carolina has been that reputation evidence is ad-
missible while opinion evidence is not.118 The general rationale for
this rule is well stated in McCormick's treatise:'
The second consideration is the manner of proof, i.e., the dis-
tinction between different types of proof which may be offered
as evidence of character. These types are (a) testimony as to the
conduct of the person in question as reflecting his character, and
(b) testimpny of a witness as to his opinion of the person's char-
acter based upon observation, and (c) testimony as to his repu-
tation. These are listed in the order of their pungency and per-
suasiveness. In the same order, they differ in their tendency
to arouse undue prejudice, to confuse and distract, to engender
time-consuming side issues and to create a risk of unfair sur-
prise. Modern common law doctrine makes the neutral and
unexciting reputation evidence the preferred type .... "I"
Besides opinion evidence, however, the new law excludes
"reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct."'' This ex-
clusion of reputation evidence represents a major change in the
law of sexual assault in South Carolina.
As set forth in State v. Taylor, 32 the rule in South Carolina
on the admissibility of reputation testimony prior to the passage
of the sexual assault law was that "the reputation for chastity of
the prosecutrix was a legitimate subject of inquiry, as bearing on
the issue whether she consented to the act . . . . The evidence
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
127. The confusion is illustrated by the following quote from State v. Lyle, 210 S.C.
87, 41 S.E.2d 625 (1947):
In the eye of the law the character of a person is to be ascertained by an inquiry
as to what is generally said or thought of him in the community where he resides.
Hence when a witness has testified on his examination in chief that the person,
as to whose character the inquiry is instituted, bears a good character, his
opinion and the value of it may be tested by asking the witness on his cross-
examination whether he has ever heard that the person whose character is in
question, has been accused of doing acts wholly inconsistent with the character
which he has attributed to him.
Id. at 91, 41 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting State v. Merriman, 34 S.C. 16, 38-39, 12 S.E. 619,
627 (1891).
128. State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900); contra, State v. Turner, 36 S.C.
534, 15 S.E. 602 (1892).
129. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1972).
130. Id. § 186, at 443 (emphasis in original).
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
132. 57 S.C. 483, 35 S.E. 729 (1900).
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as to reputation must be confined to what is said of her."'3 The
quotation states that the prosecutrix' reputation is relevant to her
propensity to consent to intercourse on a given occasion. This
issue of relevance to the issue of consent creates doubts about the
validity of the rule. The rule is applicable only when the defense
is consent."4 When consent is a defense, a testimonial contest
between complainant and defendant almost always takes place.
The defendant undoubtedly has the right to confront the com-
plainant and attack her credibility.'35 The General Assembly has
decided, however, that the defendant's right of confrontation
stops short of the introduction of reputation testimony about the
sexual conduct of the prosecuting witness.'36 Whether this statute
will withstand constitutional attack is open to doubt and deserves
reflection.
The legislature, by enacting the evidentiary portions of the
statute,'37 has made the prior sexual conduct of the complainant
legally irrelevant. A reason frequently given to justify the adop-
tion of these statutes is that
the State has a "legitimate interest" in encouraging the prose-
cution of rapists by protecting witnesses from harassment and
humiliation on the witness stand. The Legislature is validly
concerned with ensuring that complainants are not unnecessar-
ily subjected, and that complainants know they will not be un-
necessarily subjected, to the traumatic experience of having
their private lives paraded before them in the court room.',
Standing alone, however, this rationale would not justify the ex-
clusion of the evidence if the evidence was probative of and rele-
vant to the victim's consent; otherwise, the courts would be in the
133. Id. at 485, 35 S.E. at 729.
134. "Where consent is not an issue, neither evidence of general unchastity on the
part of the prosecutrix nor evidence of specific instances of unchastity, except with the
defendant, is admissible." Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)4
See Roper v. State, 375 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964); State v. Sims, 30 Utah 2d
357, 517 P.2d 1315 (1974); Powell v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 703, 20 S.E.2d 536 (1942);
contra Teague v. State, 208 Ga.. 459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951) (wherein it was stated that
"[t]hough an accused might deny intercourse, defend on the ground of mistaken identity,
or plead an alibi, still he would be entitled to show general reputation for lewdness ..
208 Ga. at 466, 67 S.E.2d at 472).
135. See, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (interpreting U.S. CONST. amend. VI);
see also S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
136. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
137. Id.
138. People v. Dawsey, 76 Mich. App. 741, 753, 257 N.W.2d 236, 244 (1977) (Kauf-
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awkward position of suppressing evidence crucial to the defense
only for the convenience and comfort of the prosecuting witness.
The foregoing concern that the witness be protected from
unnecessary harassment is bound up with another idea, "that a
woman consented to sexual intercourse on one occasion is not
substantial evidence that she consented on another, but in fact
may indicate the contrary." '39 If this proposition is sound, the
validity of the statute cannot be questioned. The state's interest
in encouraging rape prosecutions reinforces this validity. On the
other hand, if the proposition that consent on one occasion is not
substantial evidence of consent on another is unsound, or not
always sound, then the problem is of a different dimension and
constitutional rights of the defendant are in jeopardy.
The evidentiary portions of the new South Carolina statute
are virtually identical to provisions enacted earlier in Michigan."4
The appellate courts there, accordingly, have already had the
opportunity to examine the effect of the statute's pervasive exclu-
sion of evidence of prior sexual conduct. In People v. Dawsey"I
an attack was made on the constitutionality of the new law as
adopted in Michigan, but the
[d]efendant did not attempt to produce witnesses to testify
about the complainant's reputation for chastity. Had he done
so, and been denied, a serious question about the statute's con-
stitutionality would have to be faced . . . .But here, where
defendant only complains of his inability to attack the com-
plainant's veracity with cross-examination about her sexual his-
tory, there is no basis for holding the statute unconstitutional.,,'
While the majority of the court did not indicate what position it
would take were it directly faced with the question, Justice Kauf-
man, in a separate opinion, expressed his own reservations about
the efficacy of the statute:
My concern over the statute is not its objective, in a broad sense
the encouragement of rape prosecutions, but its absoluteness.
So while I can agree in any single instance that the proposed
evidence is more prejudicial than probative, I remain convinced
that trial courts, with proper guidelines and under appropriate
139. State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976).
140. Compare S.C. CoDE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977), with MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.520 (Supp. 1978).
141. 76 Mich. App. 741, 257 N.W.2d 236 (1977).
142. Id. at 753, 257 N.W.2d at 241.
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procedures, should be able to make that determination on a
case-by-case basis. I cannot believe that in all cases the evidence
would be more prejudicial than probative, the assumption the
majority makes to avoid the constitutional issue. " '
At the root of Justice Kaufman's concern, as well as the cutting
edge of any attack on the constitutionality of the statute, is the
confrontation clause of the federal and various state constitu-
tions.'44 "[W]here a constitutional right is involved, a statutory
declaration that certain evidence can never be legally relevant
demands close scrutiny."
14 5
The sixth amendment guarantees the right of a defendant in
a criminal case "to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.'"4 This right is secured for the accused in state as well as
federal criminal prosecutions.' 4' "Confrontation means more than
being allowed to confront the witness physically.' ' 4 The principal
interest secured is the right to cross-examine witnesses called
against the defendant.'49 In Davis v. Alaska51s the Supreme Court
dealt with the impact of the confrontation clause on a state law
protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders. A juvenile with a
criminal record was a crucial identification witness for the prose-
cution. The defendant attempted to impeach or discredit the
witness by drawing out his prior offenses on cross-examination,
but the line of questioning was disallowed. The Court concluded
that
[o]n these facts it seems clear to us that to make any such
inquiry effective, defense counsel should have been permitted to
expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences re-
lating to the reliability of the witness. Petitioner was thus de-
nied the right of effective cross-examination which "would be
constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of
showing of want of prejudice would cure it.""'
143. Id. at 763 n.2, 257 N.W.2d at 245 n.2 (Kaufman, J. dissenting in part, concurring
in part).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 14.
145. 76 Mich. App. at 762-63, 257 N.W.2d at 244 (Kaufman, J. dissenting in part,
concurring in part).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
148. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974).
149. Id. at 315-16.
150. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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The Court reasoned that the defendant's right to confront a hos-
tile witness was "paramount to the State's policy of protecting a
juvenile offender"'' 2 for its desire that the witness "fulfill his pub-
lic duty to testify free from embarrassment and with his reputa-
tion unblemished"'' 3 could not outweigh the defendant's right "to
seek out the truth in the process of defending himself,"' 4
At a minimum, Davis v. Alaska demonstrates that protection
of a witness from embarrassment and humiliation as a matter of
state policy, however well founded in logic and reason, is not
sufficient grounds to foreclose exploration of a witness' character
by the accused when it is crucial to his defense. The validity of
the evidentiary provisions of the new statute must therefore turn
on the remaining proposition underlying the law: that consent to
sexual acts on one or more occasions is not "substantial evidence"
of consent on another. The statute is not absolute in this sense.
It does allow, subject to strict requirements,' 5 evidence of com-
plainant's prior sexual conduct with defendant. 5" Admittedly,
that is an obvious case for an exception to an otherwise hard and
fast rule, as discussed previously. The problem is that under other
circumstances an exception to the rule of non-admissibility may
be justified. For instance, proof that the prosecutrix is a prosti-
tute would seem to be relevant to the issue of consent. The inflexi-
bility of the statute could hamstring an effort to deal with these
circumstances as they arise. If evidence of prior sexual conduct
is relevant to the issue of consent in some cases, the statute, by
making it inadmissible except for in a few limited situations, may
infringe upon the sixth amendment rights of defendants in trials
for criminal sexual conduct.
Despite the possible unconstitutionality of some sections of
South Carolina's sexual assault law, the statute, on balance, re-
mains a welcome modification of antiquated rape statutes that
unduly limited the scope of prosecutable sexual conduct. Only
time will tell if the new statute has the effect of increasing the
number of victims who come forward to complain. If the statute
has this effect, and it survives attack in the courts, it will repre-
sent a strong addition to the criminal law of South Carolina.
James Cranston Gray, Jr.
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